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[823] 
Notes 
Judicial Review of the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission’s Conciliation Efforts 
Nicole E. Teixeira* 
On June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Mach Mining, LLC v. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). The issue before the Court is 
“[w]hether and to what extent [a court may] enforce the EEOC’s mandatory duty to 
conciliate discrimination claims before filing suit.” The Court’s decision will likely 
resolve a three-way circuit split on how the EEOC’s conciliation efforts may be 
reviewed: currently, the Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits require the EEOC to 
meet a searching three-step test, while the Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits apply a 
more deferential “good faith” standard. The Seventh Circuit created the third split with 
its decision in Mach Mining. It stands alone in holding that the failure to conciliate is 
not an implied affirmative defense and there is no judicial review of conciliation. This 
Note argues that the Supreme Court should resolve the circuit split in favor of the good 
faith standard, adopting a procedural rather than substantive form of review. 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, 2015, University of California Hastings College of the Law; B.A., University 
of California, San Diego; Executive Production Editor, Hastings Law Journal. I would like to thank 
Professor Reuel Schiller for his invaluable guidance and mentorship, and the staff of the Hastings Law 
Journal for their tireless work. I dedicate this Note to my family—I am so grateful to have the 
unwavering love and support of my parents, Maria and Tex, and my brother, Elico. We are united. 
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Introduction 
In 2006, over the span of seven months, three female employees of 
Bloomberg L.P. (“Bloomberg”) filed charges with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC” or “Commission” or “agency”), 
alleging that Bloomberg had discriminated against them based on sex.1 
Based on those allegations, the EEOC, the federal agency tasked with 
enforcing laws regarding employment discrimination,2 filed suit against 
Bloomberg in 2007.3 Seven years later, the Southern District of New 
York dismissed the EEOC’s last remaining claim against the company, 
effectively ending the case at the district court level.4 Ironically, what 
likely caused—or at least complicated—seven years of litigation in 
Bloomberg was the very process designed to prevent litigation in the first 
place: conciliation. 
 
 1. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s Statement of Material Disputed Facts in 
Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Time-Barred Claims at 3–4, EEOC v. 
Bloomberg (Bloomberg I), 751 F. Supp. 2d 628 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 07-CV-8383). 
 2. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2015). See generally Herbert Hill, The Equal Employment Opportunity 
Acts of 1964 and 1972: A Critical Analysis of the Legislative History and Administration of the Law, 2 Indus. 
Rel. L.J. 1 (1977) (tracing the development of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission). 
 3. See Complaint at 1, Bloomberg I, 751 F. Supp. 2d 628 (No. 07-CV-8383). 
 4. EEOC v. Bloomberg L.P., No. 07-CV-8383, 2014 WL 2112038, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2014). 
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Under Title VII, the EEOC’s governing statute, the Commission 
must investigate each charge it receives and decide whether “there is 
reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true.”5 If it finds cause for 
the charge, the Commission must “endeavor to eliminate any such 
alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of 
conference, conciliation, and persuasion.”6 Conciliation—essentially a 
settlement discussion—is a pre-suit requirement. Before the EEOC can 
take employers to court to enforce antidiscrimination laws, it must have 
been “unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement 
acceptable to the Commission.”7  
On June 27, 2007, after it had investigated the employees’ claims, 
the EEOC provided Bloomberg with a letter describing the charges and 
the results of its investigation, and a proposed conciliation agreement.8 
Among other things, the proposed agreement asked Bloomberg to 
establish a $7.5 million claim fund for class members; pay roughly $23.4-
million total to the three claimants for back pay, front pay, and 
compensatory damages; and agree to injunctive relief.9 The EEOC 
requested a counterproposal from Bloomberg by July 11, 2007, but it 
repeatedly granted extensions upon Bloomberg’s request.10 The 
Commission also held three in-person conferences with Bloomberg and 
allowed defense counsel to meet the three charging parties.11 However, 
in its eventual counterproposal, Bloomberg dismissed “even the idea of a 
[c]laim [f]und,” offered each of the three charging parties less than one 
percent of their proposed monetary relief, and rejected the EEOC’s 
proposals for injunctive relief.12 The EEOC concluded that further 
conciliation attempts would be futile,13 and filed suit against Bloomberg 
on September 27, 2007.14 
In August 2008, as the parties engaged in extensive discovery,15 the 
EEOC identified new charges of retaliation and sent Bloomberg another 
proposed conciliation agreement concerning those claims.16 Bloomberg 
responded fairly quickly, asking for time to internally investigate the 
 
 5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 359–60 (1977); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). 
 8. See Bloomberg I, 751 F. Supp. 2d at 632. 
 9. Id. at 633. 
 10. See Employment Opportunity Commission’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Failure to Conciliate at 2, Bloomberg I, 751 F. Supp. 2d 
628 (No. 07-CV-8383). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 2–3. 
 13. Id. at 3. 
 14. See Complaint, supra note 3, at 1. 
 15. Bloomberg I, 751 F. Supp. 2d at 642. 
 16. Id. at 640. 
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claims and for more information about the EEOC’s determinations.17 
This time, Bloomberg’s counteroffer accepted many of the EEOC’s 
proposals, but the company requested continued discussion on other 
proposals and stated that it would await further information about the 
EEOC’s determinations before responding to the proposal for monetary 
relief.18 In response, the EEOC said that further information would not 
be helpful, and was thus unnecessary, but offered to discuss the 
counterproposal if Bloomberg responded to the EEOC’s monetary 
proposal first.19 An intense exchange of letters followed for nearly five 
months, with Bloomberg refusing to make a monetary offer unless it 
received more information and the EEOC refusing to respond to the 
company’s counterproposal until Bloomberg made a reasonable monetary 
offer.20 In February 2009, the EEOC again determined that conciliation 
efforts were futile,21 and the Commission added the retaliation claims via 
a second amended complaint filed on March 31, 2009.22 
Bloomberg filed a motion for summary judgment nearly three years 
after the suit began,23 arguing that because the EEOC failed to meet its 
statutory duty to conciliate, the discrimination and retaliation claims 
should be dismissed.24 On October 25, 2010, the district court issued its 
opinion on the motion for summary judgment and another pending 
motion.25 In a twenty-three page decision, Chief Judge Loretta A. Preska 
dedicated eight pages to the conciliation issue, reciting each party’s 
efforts over the years in exhaustive detail.26 Following Second Circuit 
precedent, she evaluated whether the EEOC had met its obligation to 
conciliate based on whether it had: (1) outlined the reasonable cause for 
its belief that Bloomberg had discriminated and retaliated; (2) offered 
the company the opportunity to voluntarily comply; and (3) responded in 
a reasonable and flexible manner.27 This three-part test focuses on the 
EEOC’s actions rather than the employer’s, but if the employer acts 
unreasonably, courts will generally find the EEOC’s decision to file suit 
to be reasonable given that further conciliation would be futile.28 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 640–41. 
 21. Id. at 641. 
 22. Id. at 635. 
 23. See Defendant Bloomberg L.P.’s Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s 
Failure to Conciliate at 2, Bloomberg I, 751 F. Supp. 2d 628 (No. 07-CV-8383). 
 24. Bloomberg I, 751 F. Supp. 2d at 631. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See id. at 636–43 (discussing the parties’ conduct in great detail). 
 27. Id. at 637; see also EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529, 1534 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 28. See Johnson & Higgins, 91 F.3d at 1535 (holding that the EEOC satisfied its duty to conciliate 
under the three-part test “in the face of [employer’s] insistence that its policy was not unlawful” and 
after employer refused to provide information related to the charge). 
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Ultimately, Chief Judge Preska held that although the EEOC had 
satisfied its duty to conciliate with regard to the initial discrimination 
claim, the Commission had failed to properly conciliate the retaliation 
claim because it did not “respond [to Bloomberg] in a reasonable and 
flexible manner.”29 The court noted that the ordinary remedy for failure 
to conciliate is a stay to permit the conciliation to take place.30 However, 
citing the impracticality of ordering a stay in a suit where the parties’ 
attitudes had “soured” and the fact that the case was well advanced, Chief 
Judge Preska dismissed the retaliation claims entirely.31 In a clarifying 
decision issued on September 9, 2013, she said of the dismissal: 
The Court does not impose this severe sanction lightly and recognizes 
that certain . . . claims may be meritorious but now will never see the 
inside of a courtroom. However, the Court finds that allowing the 
EEOC to revisit conciliation at this stage of the case—after shirking its 
pre-litigation investigation responsibilities and spurning Bloomberg’s 
offer of conciliation and instead engaging in extensive discovery to 
develop . . . claims—already has and would further prejudice 
Bloomberg. Moreover, if such a sanction were not imposed, the Court, 
in turn, would be sanctioning a course of action that promotes 
litigation in contravention of Title VII’s emphasis on voluntary 
proceedings and informal conciliation.32 
Chief Judge Preska’s thorough review—and subsequent dismissal—
of certain claims due to inadequate conciliation is not uncommon, but it 
is not the only approach to judicial review of the conciliation process: 
There is a three-circuit split regarding the appropriate standard of 
review.33 The Second Circuit joins the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits in 
requiring a searching three-step test,34 but the Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth 
Circuits apply a more deferential “good faith” standard of review.35 
Meanwhile, the Seventh Circuit stands alone in holding that employers 
may not use “failure to conciliate” as an affirmative defense and that the 
EEOC’s conciliation efforts are not reviewable at all.36  
On June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in EEOC v. 
Mach Mining, LLC, ostensibly to resolve the split.37 The issue before the 
 
 29. Bloomberg I, 751 F. Supp. 2d at 641. 
 30. Id. at 643. 
 31. Id. 
 32. EEOC v. Bloomberg L.P. (Bloomberg II), 967 F. Supp. 2d 802, 816 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 33. See EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171, 182 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 
3746 (U.S. June 30, 2014) (No. 13-1019).  
 34. See EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Co., 340 F.3d 1256, 1259–61 (11th Cir. 2003); EEOC v. Johnson 
& Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529, 1534–35 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying the standard in the context of Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1964); EEOC v. Klingler Elec. Corp., 636 F.2d 104, 106–07 (5th 
Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981). 
 35. See EEOC v. Keco Indus., Inc., 748 F.2d 1097, 1101–02 (6th Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Radiator 
Specialty Co., 610 F.2d 178, 183 (4th Cir. 1979); EEOC v. Zia Co., 582 F.2d 527, 532–34 (10th Cir. 1978). 
 36. Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 184. 
 37. Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 134 S. Ct. 2872, 2872 (2014). 
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Court is “[w]hether and to what extent may a court enforce the EEOC’s 
mandatory duty to conciliate discrimination claims before filing suit.”38 
This Note argues that the Supreme Court should adopt the good faith 
standard of review. Under this standard, courts would review the 
EEOC’s conciliation efforts, but such review would be procedural rather 
than substantive. Thus, courts would not review the minutiae of offers 
and counteroffers or seek to impose their own judgments on what a 
proper conciliation agreement should provide; instead, they would reserve 
judgment on the “form and substance” of conciliation agreements to the 
EEOC, and simply ensure that the EEOC had made some attempt to 
conciliate in good faith.39 
There have been instances where the EEOC has not engaged in 
conciliation in good faith;40 the danger that the Commission may abuse 
its discretion in the future is obvious.41 Some form of judicial review is 
therefore necessary. However, the good faith standard of review is 
preferable to any other standard because it eliminates the time and 
expense incurred in prolonged litigation over an alleged “failure to 
conciliate” defense and yet still protects employers from extreme abuses 
of discretion.  
Part I of this Note discusses the three standards of review, including 
the lack of any judicial analysis or explication in the early cases dealing 
with conciliation. Part II discusses how a textual reading of the EEOC’s 
governing statute, the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act, and the 
Act’s 1972 amendment support a deferential standard of review. Part III 
provides a background on persuasive principles of administrative law 
that also support deferential review. Finally, Part IV discusses elements 
of public policy that the Supreme Court should consider in establishing a 
single standard. 
 
 38. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 2014 WL 709677 (Feb. 25, 
2014) (No. 13-1019). 
 39. See, e.g., EEOC v. Zia Co., 582 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1978); EEOC v. Keco Indus., Inc., 748 
F.2d 1097, 1102 (6th Cir. 1984). 
 40. See generally EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding 
that the EEOC failed to conciliate in good faith). In Asplundh, the EEOC sent a single proposed 
conciliation agreement to the employer after conducting a thirty-two month long investigation. Id. at 
1258. Three weeks later, the employer’s newly retained counsel requested an extension of time to 
respond to the proposal. Id. The EEOC did not acknowledge the letter in any way. Id. Instead, the 
very next day, the agency declared that conciliation had been unsuccessful and further attempts would 
be futile. Id. at 1258–59. Two weeks later, it filed a complaint against Asplundh. Id. at 1259. 
 41. See generally Ashutosh Bhagwat, Modes of Regulatory Enforcement and the Problem of 
Administrative Discretion, 50 Hastings L.J. 1275, 1304 (1999) (“The basic substantive concern . . . is 
that agencies and agency personnel will use the relatively unfettered authority they enjoy . . . in order 
to coerce compliance from regulated entities with substantive rules and interpretations which are of 
their own creation and are inconsistent with the norms laid out by the legislature or the courts.”). 
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I.  The Circuit Splits 
A. The Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits: A Searching Inquiry 
In one of the earliest cases to establish a searching review of 
conciliation, EEOC v. Klingler, the Fifth Circuit held that the EEOC 
could meet its burden to conciliate if it had (1) outlined the reasonable 
basis for its investigation to the employer; (2) given the employer the 
opportunity to voluntarily comply with the law; and (3) flexibly 
responded to the reasonable attitudes of the employer.42 In creating 
these guidelines, the Fifth Circuit relied on the reasoning of Marshall v. 
Sun Oil Company.43 In Marshall, the Fifth Circuit held that the key to 
determining whether the EEOC’s conciliation efforts were adequate was 
the reasonableness of the agency’s conduct.44 Following Marshall, the 
Klingler court similarly emphasized the reasonableness and the 
responsiveness of the EEOC in reviewing its efforts at conciliation.45 
However, the Klingler court also held that the lower court had erred in 
failing to look beyond the face of the proposed conciliation agreement, 
and that it was in fact required to make a more searching inquiry into the 
relevant facts of the conciliation negotiations.46 Later decisions in the 
Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits transformed the guiding language of 
Marshall and Klingler (the EEOC “may fulfill [its] statutorily required 
duty of conciliation”)47 into the mandatory three-part test used in EEOC 
v. Bloomberg L.P.48 From the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in EEOC v. 
Asplundh Tree Expert Company, for example: 
To satisfy the statutory requirement of conciliation, the EEOC must 
(1) outline to the employer the reasonable cause for its belief that Title 
VII has been violated; (2) offer an opportunity for voluntary 
compliance; and (3) respond in a reasonable and flexible manner to the 
reasonable attitudes of the employer.49 
In Asplundh, the Eleventh Circuit noted repeatedly that “the duty 
to conciliate is at the heart of Title VII” and stated that the EEOC’s 
governing statute clearly echoed congressional intent to settle Title VII 
violations out of court.50 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit held, the EEOC 
must make “nothing less” than a reasonable effort to resolve alleged 
 
 42. EEOC v. Klingler Elec. Corp., 636 F.2d 104, 107 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Marshall v. Sun Oil Co. (Del.), 605 F.2d 1331, 1337, 1339 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 45. Klingler, 636 F.2d. at 107. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Marshall, 605 F.2d at 1339 (emphasis added).  
 48. See EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that a 
three-part test applies to review of EEOC’s conciliation attempts); EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 
91 F.3d 1529, 1534 (2d Cir. 1996); Klingler, 636 F.2d. at 107. 
 49. Asplundh, 340 F.3d at 1259 (emphasis added). 
 50. Id. at 1260. 
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unlawful discrimination practices with the employer, and, at a minimum, 
must make clear the basis for the charges against the employer.51 In 
addition to pursuing conciliation in good faith, the Eleventh Circuit 
emphasized that the EEOC has a statutory duty to “reserve judicial action 
as a last resort.”52 
Importantly, in establishing the fairly rigorous standard for reviewing 
EEOC conciliation efforts, neither the Marshall nor Klingler courts 
explained why it was appropriate to review the Commission’s efforts in 
the first place, or why review must be in the form of this three-step test.53 
In the earliest case, Marshall, the court reviewed the EEOC’s 
conciliation efforts using three steps somewhat similar to the test later 
adopted by Klingler—evaluating (1) whether the Commission “present[ed] 
a reasonable showing of discrimination”; (2) how the employer responded; 
and (3) how the EEOC responded—but called it merely a “heuristic 
device,” and appeared to simply assume that detailed judicial review was 
proper.54 The three-part test appeared for the first time in Klingler as a 
permissive way for the EEOC to meet the conciliation requirement, and 
the court also declined to offer any justification for such a standard.55 
The other courts that adopted the three-part test from Marshall or 
Klingler—including the Eleventh Circuit in Asplundh—are likewise 
silent on the overall rationale of the scheme; they simply recite the test, 
cite to the cases, and move on.56 
Without a clear rationale for the existence of the three-part test, it is 
somewhat difficult to justify why it should be adopted as the overall 
standard of review for conciliation. In contrast to the Second, Fifth, and 
Eleven Circuits, however, the Tenth Circuit took a more reasoned 
approach when it established the good faith standard.57 
B. The Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits: Deferential “Good Faith” 
In EEOC v. Zia Company, the Tenth Circuit looked to the EEOC’s 
governing statute, the legislative history, and case law in deciding that 
the EEOC must be held to a good faith standard.58 From the statutory 
language and existing case law, the court reasoned, “it has generally been 
held that a showing of some effort is a precondition of bringing suit.”59 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 1261. 
 53. See generally Asplundh, 340 F.3d 1256; Klingler, 636 F.2d. 104; Marshall v. Sun Oil Co. (Del.), 
605 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 54. Marshall, 605 F.2d at 1335–36. 
 55. See Klingler, 636 F.2d. at 107. 
 56. See EEOC v. Agro Distrib., LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 467–69 (5th Cir. 2009); Asplundh, 340 F.3d at 
1259–61; EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529, 1533–35 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 57. See generally EEOC v. Zia Co., 582 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1978). 
 58. Id. at 533. 
 59. Id. at 532. 
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The Zia court found Brennan v. Ace Hardware Corporation, an Eighth 
Circuit case dealing with the Secretary of Labor’s conciliation efforts 
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 
to have applicable reasoning.60 In Ace Hardware, the Eighth Circuit held 
that the Secretary did not fulfill his obligation to conciliate when his 
office had two personal meetings and a telephone call with a defendant 
employer but did not give the employer a chance to respond.61 That 
court emphasized that voluntary compliance was an integral part of the 
ADEA, and the legislative history of the act “strongly indicate[d]” that 
the Secretary must essentially make near-exhaustive efforts to obtain 
voluntary compliance before bringing suit.62 Similarly, the Zia court held, 
the legislative history of the EEOC’s governing statute indicates that the 
Commission should make “every effort to conciliate” before bringing 
suit.63 And, the court held, because the EEOC’s governing statute itself 
states that the agency “shall” seek conciliation, “it is inconceivable to us 
that good faith efforts [on the part of the Commission] are not 
required.”64 However, the Zia court also held that while the EEOC is 
required to act in good faith while pursuing its conciliation efforts, courts 
should not closely review the details of offers and counteroffers between 
the parties or seek to impose their own judgment on what a proper 
conciliation agreement should provide.65  
In EEOC v. Radiator Specialty Company, the Fourth Circuit adopted 
Zia, holding, “[t]he law requires . . . no more than a good faith attempt at 
conciliation.”66 The Fourth Circuit also emphasized that the EEOC’s 
duty to conciliate is “one of its most essential functions,” and a precondition 
for suit.67 Nevertheless, citing Zia’s standard, the Fourth Circuit 
dismissed the employer’s claim that the EEOC had not made a good 
faith effort in a few sentences, citing the employer’s refusal to meet with 
the EEOC despite being given several opportunities to do so.68  
Similarly, in EEOC v. Keco Industries, the Sixth Circuit—citing 
Radiator—also held that the EEOC must make a good faith effort to 
conciliate. In contrast to Zia and Radiator, however, the Sixth Circuit 
took an even more hands-off approach. The court held that in the 
underlying case, the district court had applied the wrong standard of 
 
 60. Id. at 533 (citing Brennan v. Ace Hardware Corp., 495 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1974)). 
 61. See Ace Hardware, 495 F.2d at 374. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Zia, 582 F.2d at 533 (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. H1861 (Mar. 8, 1972), reprinted in Subcomm. on 
Labor of the Comm. on Labor and Pub. Welfare, 92nd Cong., Legislative History of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, at 1856). 
 64. Id.  
 65. Id. 
 66. EEOC v. Radiator Specialty Co., 610 F.2d 178, 183 (4th Cir. 1979). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
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review regarding conciliation.69 Rather than judging the efficacy of the 
EEOC’s approach, the court held, “[t]he district court should only 
determine whether the EEOC made an attempt at conciliation.”70 The 
“form and substance of those conciliations,” the Sixth Circuit held, is 
specifically reserved to the discretion of the EEOC, “beyond judicial 
review.”71 
The good faith standard and the more rigorous three-part test have 
the same goal: to ensure the EEOC actually conciliates, and thereby 
prevent abuses of discretion by the agency. In comparison to the good 
faith standard, however, the three-part test accomplishes this goal by 
requiring courts to closely examine the substance of the parties’ efforts. 
This leads to inefficient Bloomberg-esque situations, in which both the 
courts and the parties expend a great deal of time and effort investigating 
and explaining their conduct. On the other hand, courts following the 
good faith standard look to whether the EEOC has made a good faith 
attempt at conciliation based on largely procedural considerations, 
reserving judgment on the “form and substance” of conciliation 
agreements to the EEOC.72 Such an approach makes sense in the context 
of a statutory scheme that requires the EEOC to have been “‘unable to 
secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the 
Commission’” before it files suit.73 A procedurally based, more deferential 
standard also means courts will likely spend much less time adjudicating 
whether the EEOC actually conciliated. 
In contrast to courts that have adopted the three-part test, the 
Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits explicitly examined the language of the 
EEOC’s governing statute, legislative history, and case law. The Seventh 
Circuit did the same, but came to a radically different conclusion: no 
review. 
C. The Seventh Circuit: No Review 
In EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, a mining company accused of 
discriminating against women sought to dismiss the EEOC’s case against 
it on the grounds the Commission had failed to meet the conciliation 
requirement before filing suit.74 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that 
the EEOC’s alleged failure to conciliate was not an affirmative defense 
to a suit for unlawful discrimination, and any judicial review of conciliation 
would undermine its very purpose.75 In support of its holding, the court 
 
 69. EEOC v. Keco Indus., Inc., 748 F.2d 1097, 1102 (6th Cir. 1984). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. 
 73. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2015) (emphasis added). 
 74. EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171, 172 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 75. Id. at 172, 178–79. 
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noted that Title VII contains no express provision for an affirmative 
defense based on a failure to conciliate.76 Instead, the express language 
of Title VII clearly placed the informal, confidential process of 
conciliation solely within the purview of the EEOC’s judgment, using 
deferential language that requires the Commission to “endeavor to 
eliminate” unlawful discrimination by “informal methods,” and allowing 
the agency to sue if it cannot reach an agreement “acceptable to the 
Commission.”77 The court also noted that an implied affirmative defense 
based on the failure to conciliate would conflict directly with the 
statutorily imposed requirement to keep the conciliation process 
confidential.78 Instead of implying both an affirmative defense and an 
exception to the confidentiality provision that would allow courts to 
evaluate conciliation, the Seventh Circuit reasoned, “[t]he better reading 
is to avoid the conflict, stick to the text, and reject both.”79 
The Seventh Circuit also found that its holding was consistent with 
principles of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), which ordinarily 
governs how federal courts may review agency decisions.80 The court 
noted that the lack of a workable standard for courts to review 
conciliation made the process “look very much like an action ‘committed 
to agency discretion by law,’” which is exempt from the APA’s general 
presumption of judicial review.81  
According to the Seventh Circuit, any judicial review of conciliation 
would also undermine the process itself.82 In requiring the EEOC to 
conciliate before initiating suit, Congress intended to maintain a 
preference for employers’ voluntary compliance with the law.83 However, 
the Seventh Circuit reasoned, allowing an alleged “failure to conciliate” 
to be used as an affirmative defense against litigation would let 
employers argue for the dismissal or at least the delay of cases against 
them.84 Rather than encouraging voluntary compliance or even settlement 
discussions in general, such a defense encourages employers to use 
litigation to simply “stockpile exhibits for the coming court battle.”85 The 
Seventh Circuit also rejected the respondent’s argument that judges must 
police the EEOC because the agency will otherwise abandon or abuse 
the conciliation process.86 The court noted that the EEOC is constrained 
 
 76. See id. 
 77. Id. at 174. 
 78. Id. at 174–75. 
 79. Id. at 175. 
 80. Id. at 177. 
 81. Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C § 701(a)(2) (2013)). 
 82. Id. at 178–79. 
 83. Id.  
 84. Id. at 179. 
 85. Id.  
 86. See id.  
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by the practical limits of its budget and personnel in terms of choosing 
how many charges it can pursue in court,87 and it is checked by the two 
other branches of government.88 
However, the Seventh Circuit’s holding that there is absolutely no 
review of the conciliation process is untenable when viewed in light of 
three issues: First, the statutory construction of Title VII and its 
legislative history, taken together, indicate that at least procedural 
review is contemplated. Second, principles of administrative law, while 
not determinative, also support a deferential standard of review. Finally, 
policy considerations—and the fact that abuses of discretion have 
occurred—advance the argument for judicial review generally. 
II.  Title VII: The EEOC’s Governing Statute 
A. Statutory Construction 
As both the “good faith” circuits and the Seventh Circuit determined, 
both the statutory construction and the legislative history of Title VII 
support a deferential standard of review. The EEOC was created under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Act” or “1972 Act”).89 At its 
inception, the EEOC only had the power to conciliate.90 In 1972, 
however, Congress gave the EEOC the authority to sue nongovernmental 
respondents, such as employers, unions, and employment agencies, in 
federal court to enforce laws regarding employment discrimination.91 The 
Act empowers the EEOC to decide whether to pursue or dismiss charges of 
discrimination.92 If the Commission finds reasonable cause to pursue a 
charge, 
the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful 
employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, 
and persuasion. Nothing said or done during and as a part of such 
informal endeavors may be made public by the Commission, its 
officers or employees, or used as evidence in a subsequent proceeding 
without the written consent of the persons concerned. Any person who 
makes public information in violation of this subsection shall be fined 
not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or 
both.93 
Additionally, the EEOC must have been “unable to secure from the 
respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission” 
 
 87. Id. at 180. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See generally Hill, supra note 2. 
 90. Id. at 51–52. 
 91. See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a)–(c) (2015). 
 92. Id. § 2000e-5(b). 
 93. Id. 
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before it files suit.94 Although the statute requires the EEOC to serve 
notice of the charge on the employer, it allows the agency to determine 
the form and substance of said notice.95 
 At first glance, the language of the Act seems to indicate that no 
review is proper: it is exceptionally deferential to the EEOC, and the 
confidentiality provision poses obvious problems for judicial review. For 
example: the statute expressly reserves the discretion to decide when a 
conciliation agreement is acceptable to the Commission—not to the 
courts or any other body.96 And with phrases like “[i]f the Commission 
determines,” “endeavor to eliminate,” and “informal methods,” as the 
Seventh Circuit held, “[i]t would be difficult for Congress to have packed 
more deference to agency decision-making into so few lines of text.”97 
The Act also provides no guidance as to what standard courts should use 
to review conciliation—in fact, it does not mention judicial review at 
all.98 Additionally, even if review were proper, the confidentiality 
provision would force courts wishing to evaluate the substance of the 
conciliation process to do so blindly, without evidence, unless both 
parties agree to disclose information from the conciliation proceedings.99  
 However, when examined in the context of the legislative history of 
the Act, general principles of administrative law, and public policy 
considerations, it is apparent that the statutory language merely implies 
that the EEOC is owed substantive discretion, not procedural discretion. 
Thus, although courts should not review the substantive aspects of 
conciliation—for example, the details of offers and counteroffers made—
courts should ensure that the EEOC has met its procedural requirement 
to conciliate before it files suit. Under this regime, the EEOC could meet 
this procedural check by simply showing that it provided the respondent 
with the appropriate notices, as required by the Act, and attempted to 
communicate with them. Absent the respondent offering some evidence 
that the EEOC did not in fact attempt to communicate with them, or that 
the agency’s effort was made in such egregious bad faith that it would not 
even qualify as an attempt, the EEOC will have met its procedural 
burden. 
 The Seventh Circuit argues that a court that attempts to make the 
distinction between substantive and procedural review in this context will 
“almost inevitably find itself engaged in a prohibited inquiry into the 
substantive reasonableness of particular offers—not to mention using 
confidential and inadmissible materials as evidence—unless its review 
 
 94. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1); see Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 359–60 (1977).  
 95. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1). 
 96. Id.  
 97. Id. § 2000e-5; EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171, 174 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 98. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 175.  
 99. Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 177.  
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were so cursory as to be meaningless.”100 Admittedly, the standard 
discussed here would lend itself to only cursory review. But given that 
the Act itself states that the Commission need only “endeavor” to 
eliminate discrimination through conciliation, and that any conciliation 
agreement must only be acceptable to the Commission,101 it is an 
appropriate standard. Congress has vested the EEOC with significant 
decisionmaking capabilities, and courts should not interfere with such an 
expression of congressional intent absent a finding of bad faith on the 
part of the agency. A deferential good faith standard is therefore 
appropriate. 
B. Legislative History 
The legislative history of Title VII also supports a deferential 
standard of review. When the EEOC moved from enforcing the Civil 
Rights Act through voluntary conciliation to enforcing it through 
litigation with the passage of the 1972 Act,102 the Senate debated making 
conciliation agreements reviewable in court.103 An early version of the 
act proposed: “If the Commission determines . . . that it is unable to 
secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the 
Commission, [that] determination shall not be reviewable in any 
court.”104 Senators James Browning Allen of Alabama and Sam J. Ervin 
Jr. of North Carolina proposed an amendment eliminating the words 
“which determination shall not be reviewable in any court.”105 Senator 
Ervin argued that disallowing judicial review would subject employers to 
the “whims and caprices” of “five men who are not elected by anybody 
to do anything, and who are not responsible to anybody for anything 
they do, and whose actions cannot be effectively reviewed by courts of 
justice.”106 In essence, he said, “if a man is perfectly willing to comply 
with the law, he ought to be able to show the court that he was willing to 
make an agreement in compliance with the law but that the Commission 
demanded more; and, therefore, he ought never have been brought to 
court.”107 However, in a debate with Senator Ervin, Senator Harrison A. 
Williams of New Jersey pointed out the difficulties of creating an 
objective record for a judge to be able to review the conciliation process, 
 
 100. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5; Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 175.  
 101. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). 
 102. See Hill, supra note 2, at 51–52. 
 103. See 118 Cong. Rec. 3802–07 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 1972), reprinted in Subcomm. on Labor of the 
Comm. on Labor and Pub. Welfare, 92nd Cong., Legislative History of the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act of 1972, at 1455–79 (1972). 
 104. Id. at 3799. 
 105. Id. at 3803. 
 106. Id. at 3799–3800 (statement of Sen. Ervin). 
 107. Id. at 3806. 
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saying, “I would not want to burden any judge with a review of anything 
that imprecise.”108 The Allen-Ervin amendment to allow for judicial 
review of conciliation was defeated by a vote of forty-nine to fourteen.109 
Ultimately, for reasons that are not clear from the legislative 
history, the final bill omitted any mention of judicial review at all.110 
When introducing the conference report of the bill in the House, 
however, Representative Carl D. Perkins of Kentucky—acknowledging 
“there were some very deeply felt differences”—stated, “The conferees 
contemplate that the Commission will continue to make every effort to 
conciliate as is required by existing law. Only if conciliation proves to be 
impossible do we expect the Commission to bring action in Federal 
district court to seek enforcement.”111 Even considering Representative 
Perkins’s statement, however, the legislative history as a whole supports 
a good faith standard of review, as opposed to a heightened level of 
review or no review at all.  
The good faith standard addresses both Senator Ervin and Senator 
Williams’ concerns: it allows courts to ensure that the EEOC has 
conciliated in good faith while at the same time avoiding a searching 
inquiry that could prove troublesome to apply. Additionally, although 
Representative Perkins used strong language regarding conciliation in 
introducing the conference report, both the report’s section-by-section 
analysis of the bill and the language that eventually became law gave the 
EEOC complete discretion to decide when a conciliation agreement is 
acceptable.112 This indicates a congressional preference for deferring to 
the agency within the realm of conciliation agreements. Thus, while the 
legislative history of the 1972 Act indicates that some level of judicial 
review over conciliation is proper, it should be deferential to the agency. 
III.  Principles of Administrative Law 
The good faith standard of review is also supported by principles of 
administrative law. As the Seventh Circuit noted, some arguments for 
judicial review of the conciliation process “rel[y] heavily on the . . . 
‘presumption of judicial review’ that is so central to American law in 
general and the APA in particular.”113 Principles of administrative law 
 
 108. Id. (statement of Sen. Williams). 
 109. Id. at 3807. 
 110. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2015). 
 111. 118 Cong. Rec. 7563 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1972) (statement of Rep. Perkins), reprinted in 
Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm. on Labor and Pub. Welfare, 92nd Cong., Legislative History of 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, at 1855–56 (1972). 
 112. Id.; H. Rep. No. 92-899, at 1 (1972), reprinted in Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm. on Labor 
and Pub. Welfare, 92nd Cong., Legislative History of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act 
of 1972, at 1822 (1972); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). 
 113. EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171, 177 (7th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). 
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are therefore helpful in providing background and in examining whether 
and what kind of judicial review should apply to the conciliation process. 
A. Final Action and the Reviewability Exception Under the APA 
Under the APA, whether conciliation would be judicially 
reviewable depends on whether it is a final agency action and whether 
the reviewability exception applies. Under section 704 of the APA, “[a] 
preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not 
directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency 
action.”114 However, the APA exempts “agency action . . . committed to 
agency discretion by law” from judicial review.115 Although the 
discretion exception is “very narrow,”116 it applies “if a careful analysis of 
the statutory language, statutory structure, legislative history, and the 
nature of the agency action requires it.”117 According to the legislative 
history of the APA, the exception is “applicable in those rare instances 
where ‘statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there 
is no law to apply.’”118 
The Supreme Court has applied the discretion exception in two 
relevant cases: Heckler v. Chaney119 and Webster v. Doe.120 In Heckler, 
the Court held the discretion exception barred review of the Food and 
Drug Administration’s (“FDA”) decision not to take enforcement action 
against states that administered capital punishment by the lethal 
injection of drugs not approved for that particular use.121 As the Court 
later explained in Webster, since the statute, which conferred power on 
the FDA to forbid the misbranding or misuse of drugs, did not provide a 
substantive standard upon which a court could base its review, the 
agency’s enforcement actions were committed to its own discretion.122 
Similarly, in Webster, the Court found that the Central Intelligence 
Agency’s (“CIA”) decision to fire an employee was committed to the 
discretion of the Director of the CIA.123 The Court reasoned that the 
governing statute, which provided that the Director had the power to 
terminate the employment of CIA employees whenever she “‘shall deem 
such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United 
 
 114. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2015). 
 115. Id. § 701(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
 116. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971). 
 117. Home Builders Ass’n of Greater Chi. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 335 F.3d 607, 615 (7th 
Cir. 2003). 
 118. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410 (quoting S. Rep. No. 79-752, at 26 (1945)). 
 119. 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
 120. 486 U.S. 592 (1988). 
 121. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 837–38. 
 122. Webster, 486 U.S. at 600. 
 123. Id. at 601. 
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States,’”124 was so vague that it did not supply courts with law to apply in 
order to determine whether the Director’s decision was within statutory 
bounds.125 
Just as the statutes governing the FDA126 and the CIA127 provided 
no substantive standard for review, the 1972 Act governing the EEOC 
provides no substantive standard by which courts could review 
conciliation.128 As discussed above, the 1972 Act grants the EEOC 
discretion over, among other things, when to investigate or dismiss 
charges and when to accept or reject a conciliation agreement.129 It 
provides no guidelines as to how a court should review its conciliation 
efforts, and in fact contains a confidentiality provision that essentially 
prevents courts from looking into the substance of conciliation 
discussions without the consent of both parties.130 As the Seventh Circuit 
reasoned, “[this] reasoning is consistent with the APA [discretion] 
exception because the statutory directive to attempt conciliation is so 
similar to those open-ended grants of authority that courts have found 
committed to agency discretion by law and thus not subject to judicial 
review under the APA.”131 
Although the reviewability exception would seem to support the 
Seventh Circuit’s view that any judicial review of conciliation is not 
proper, given the need to protect against abuses of EEOC discretion, this 
guiding—not controlling—background to the APA serves to show that 
review of the EEOC’s conciliation efforts should be deferential, not 
strict. 
B. Judicial Review of Agency Action Generally  
Continuing with the APA thought experiment: if conciliation were 
considered a final agency action, or not exempt from the APA, the next 
step would be to determine what kind of judicial review should apply. 
This depends at least in part on whether the agency determination is a 
question of fact or a question of law.132 Courts review facts rather than 
law when they “review agency conclusions about the world, rather than 
about the agency’s legal authority to act in the world.”133 Generally 
 
 124. Id. at 600 (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 403(c) (1988)). 
 125. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 600 (1988).  
 126. See id.  
 127. See id.  
 128. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2015). 
 129. Id. § 2000e-5(f). 
 130. Id. § 2000e-5(b). 
 131. EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171, 177 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 132. David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 Va. L. Rev. 135, 143 (2010). 
 133. Id. at 147 (emphasis added). 
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speaking, however, in either case, judicial review of agency action is 
permeated by deference. 
Agency interpretations of law are generally reviewable under “the 
deferential Chevron standard [or] the less deferential Skidmore 
standard.”134 Agency findings of fact are generally reviewed under the 
“substantial evidence” standard if the findings are made on the record, or 
under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard if they are made 
informally.135 Thus, courts overrule agency findings of fact under the 
former standard if “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 
accept as adequate to support a conclusion’”136 is not present, or under 
the latter standard if the fact-finding was done in an arbitrary or 
capricious manner.137 Compared to, say, de novo review, these standards 
“give[] the agency the benefit of the doubt.”138  
 Here, then, the general approach to judicial review of agency 
action is most consistent with the good faith standard. The good faith 
standard gives the EEOC at least “the benefit of the doubt” as to 
whether it has properly conciliated, but still allows courts to review the 
agency’s actions in order to protect against abuse. 
IV.  Policy Considerations 
General policy considerations regarding conciliation also favor a 
deferential standard of review. One of the primary rationales for 
adopting the heightened scrutiny standard is the fear that the EEOC will 
abuse its discretion, as the court found it did in the Asplundh case. In 
Asplundh, the EEOC investigated a racial discrimination charge for 
thirty-two months, and, after determining it had reasonable cause, sent 
the defendant a proposed conciliation agreement and requested a 
response within twelve business days.139 Although an individual not 
employed by Asplundh had committed the discriminatory action, the 
EEOC did not provide any theory of liability in its proposed conciliation 
agreement.140 The agreement instead required that the employee in 
question be reinstated, even though the project on which he had worked 
ended three years earlier; that he be paid front pay; and that Asplundh 
create a nationwide antidiscrimination program for its employees.141 
Asplundh responded with a request for an extension of time to prepare a 
 
 134. Id. at 143–44. 
 135. Id. at 148–49. 
 136. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (quoting Consolidated Edison 
Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).  
 137. Zaring, supra note 132, at 149. 
 138. Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 377 (1998). 
 139. EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Co., 340 F.3d 1256, 1257–58 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 140. See id. 
 141. Id. at 1258. 
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response, but the next day the EEOC terminated conciliation and 
announced its intent to sue.142 The agency filed suit thirteen days later.143  
Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit applied the heightened three-step 
standard and held that the EEOC did not meet its conciliation 
obligations. It also held that in light of the agency’s “fail[ure] to fulfill its 
statutory duty to act in good faith to achieve conciliation,” dismissal and 
an award of attorney’s fees in favor of Asplundh was not an unreasonable 
remedy.144 Asplundh and cases like it demonstrate that, contrary to the 
Seventh Circuit’s holding, at least some level of review is necessary to 
ensure that the EEOC actually conciliates. However, as described below, 
the need for a heightened standard of review is unfounded because, 
coupled with the good faith standard of review, the EEOC has a number 
of safeguards that would protect against abuse of discretion. 
A. Checks on EEOC’s Power 
“[P]unishment is expensive; persuasion is cheap.”145 It is far easier 
and more efficient for the EEOC to resolve charges through conciliation 
rather than litigation. Even if the EEOC fails to properly conciliate, with 
a good faith standard of judicial review, that failing can be corrected at 
trial with a stay in the proceedings. The employer would still have the 
opportunity to settle at any time during trial, and in fact, “district courts 
have many tools available to encourage reasonable settlements.”146 
Additionally, due to its limited budget, the EEOC is motivated to settle 
before or during litigation.147 In the 2013 fiscal year, the Commission 
investigated over 90,000 charges of discrimination.148 Of the 3,515 cases it 
deemed to have reasonable cause, 1,437 were successfully conciliated.149 
Of the 2,078 unsuccessfully conciliated claims,150 the EEOC only filed 
148 suits, the fewest it has filed in sixteen years.151 The EEOC’s ability to 
pursue its charges of discrimination in court is constrained by limitations 
on budget and personnel.152 Therefore, it is in the agency’s best interest 
 
 142. Id. at 1260. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 1261. 
 145. Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation 
Debate 26 (1992). 
 146. EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171, 181 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 147. Id. at 181–82. 
 148. Enforcement and Litigation Statistics: All Statutes FY 1997–FY 2013, Equal Emp’t Opportunity 
Comm’n, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/all.cfm (last visited Apr. 4, 2015). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Enforcement and Litigation Statistics: EEOC Litigation Statistics, FY 1997 Through FY 2013, 
Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/litigation.cfm 
(last visited Apr. 4, 2015). 
 152. Brief for the Respondent at 12, Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 2014 WL 2201045 (May 27, 
2014) (No. 13-1019). 
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to fulfill its statutory duties by conciliating claims rather than engaging in 
long, protracted litigation with one party at a time. 
B. Intent and Purpose of Title VII 
As the Seventh Circuit explained, heightened judicial review of 
conciliation “invites employers to use the conciliation process to 
undermine enforcement of Title VII rather than to take the conciliation 
process seriously as an opportunity to resolve a dispute.”153 Subjecting 
what was intended to be an informal conference to substantive judicial 
review allows employers to turn the conciliation process into a forum for 
gathering ammunition for the coming dispute. Intense judicial review of 
conciliation rarely leads to a positive outcome; rather, it “protracts and 
complicates” the litigation process.154 The intent and purpose of Title 
VII—to prevent discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin155—is not met by allowing a standard of judicial review 
for conciliation that results in cases akin to Bloomberg. In Bloomberg, 
the parties engaged in combative litigation over conciliation that 
protracted and embittered the case.156 This behavior resulted in the 
dismissal of potentially meritorious claims.157 This is not a just result, nor 
one contemplated by Title VII. Indeed, the possibility that an employer 
can discriminate and later avoid liability by arguing that the EEOC did not 
meet its burden to conciliate only serves to create a system with poor 
incentives. Rather than encouraging settlement and voluntary 
compliance with the law, it rewards employers who use conciliation to 
simply collect evidence of the agency’s “bad faith” as a defense to the 
ensuing litigation. 
Conclusion 
The Supreme Court should adopt the procedural “good faith” 
standard in reviewing the EEOC’s attempts to conciliate. Statutory 
interpretation, the legislative history of Title VII, principles of 
administrative law, and public policy considerations all support the 
adoption of such a standard. The EEOC is in the best position to know 
when further attempts at conciliation would be futile, and the agency 
already has the statutory discretion to decide whether a conciliation 
agreement is acceptable.158 Even if allowing courts to use a form of 
heightened scrutiny to probe the conciliation process would not 
 
 153. EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171, 180 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 154. Id. at 179. 
 155. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2015). 
 156. See Bloomberg II, 967 F. Supp. 2d 802, 816 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 157. Id. (dismissing case while acknowledging that discrimination claims that may be meritorious 
“now will never see the inside of a courtroom”). 
 158. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(f)(1). 
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contradict the statutorily imposed requirement to keep the conciliation 
process confidential,159 closely examining the parties’ behavior under the 
heightened standard only slows down the litigation process and 
encourages employers to engage in pointless infighting. Requiring a 
procedural showing of a good faith attempt by the EEOC, and applying 
such a standard in a deferential manner, protects against abuses of power 
but stays true to the spirit of Title VII by encouraging voluntary 
conciliation. 
 
 159. EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171, 174–75 (7th Cir. 2013). 
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